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EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

action is highly commendable and will hopefilly be emulated throughout the region; it also affords an opportunity for further reflection on the problematic relationship between political justice and constitutionalism.
One should not dismiss political justice as being ultimately reducible to revenge or to the whim of those in
power. Politicaljustice has a legitimate place in a comprehensive scheme ofjustice meant for a society with a past
marked by a wide gap between moral and legal norms.
Indeed, comprehensivejustice must be both forward- and
backward-looking as it must address genuine issues of
compensation and retribution as well as those of distribution. Moreover, when reliance on established legal norms
is insufficient to effectuate the requisite dictates of compensatory and retributivejustice, recourse to politicalj ustice could well bejustified.
Notwithstanding its potential for legitimacy, politicaljustice remains antagonistic to constitutionalism's commitment to the rule of law. In the case of constitutions
enacted after violent rupture with the past, the demands
of political justice might be reconciled with those of constitutionalism by confining the operation of politicaljustice to the revolutionary period separating the ancien regime
from the new constitutional order. Even where that is
not possible, accommodation could still be achieved, in
cases where the ancien regime altogether failed to
criminalize reprehensible conduct, through appeal to unwritten law or through incorporation of legal norms embodied in international covenants.
When it comes to Hungary and to most of the remaining East and Central European democracies, however, there appears to be no justification for relying on
either of these two alternative ways of reconciling political justice and constitutionalism. Focusing on Hungary
in particular, the transition to constitutionalism was
achieved without revolutionary rupture while the type
of reprehensible conduct sought to be punished through
enactment of the retroactivity law was fully subject to
criminal sanction under the socialist regime. Under these
circumstances, the call for political justice must derive its
justification from the socialist state's failure to prosecute
certain criminal offenders for "political reasons." This, in
turn, leads to the following paradox: past injustices and
the flouting of the rule of law may be redressed through
application of a retroactivity law, but since the determination of what constitutes a "political reason" itself depends on political criteria, use ofa retroactivity law seems

bound to undermine adherence to the rule oflaw. In the
abstract there seems to be no way out of this paradox.
Given the historical socialist disregard for the rule of law,
however, the Hungarian constitutional court's decision
and its commitment to the rule of law as an independent
constitutional value seem eminently wise.
Invalidation ofretroactivity laws does not entail abandoning the aims ofcomprehensivejustice. It merely forecloses using criminal law to achieve the objectives of political justice.
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The question before Hungary's constitutional court is
important to the transitions

taking place now in East and
Central Europe, but it is also
one which has long fascinated
legal scholars. What are the rule-of-law constraints on
the retroactive application of criminal justice?
In its decision on the November 1991 Law Concerning the Prosecutability of Offenses Committed Between
December 21, 1944 and May 2,1990, Hungary's constitutional court held that tampering with the statutes of
limitations for treason and homicide was unconstitutional
and offensive to principles ofrule oflaw: "Legal certainty
based on objective and formal principles takes precedence
overjustice which is partial and subjective at all times."
To what extent was the constitutional court's decision to invalidate the legislation required by rule-of-law
principles? Below I suggest that principles of rule of law
may well justify upholding that part of the challenged
legislation which revives the statute of limitations for
homicide; and I offer a basis for distinguishing the
tamperings as to treason and homicide, particularly ho-
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micide committed against civilians on political grounds.
The rule-of-law principle the challenged legislation
was held to offend is that of nula prna sine lege. This
principle against retroactivity in the operation of criminal justice requires that as a matter of fairness persons

ought not to be held accountable for offenses not known
to be unlawful at the time they were committed. The

relevant question becomes whether the prosecutable acts
would have been offenses and unlawfil at the time of
their occurrence.
According to the above principle, the revivals of the
statute of limitations for treason and homicide in the challenged legislation arguably are distinguishable. As to the
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treason offense, the reimposition of the statute of limita-

tions today presents a tampering of a substantive nature.
A post-Communist understanding of treason is utterly
different from the understanding of treason during the
prior regime. In 1956, at the time of the treasonous acts
in question, persons committing the acts would not have
known of their criminal nature. As to this offense, therefore, the revival of the statute of limitations constitutes
substantive retroactive legislation.
Concerning the offense of homicide, in distinction,
the revival of the statute of limitations does not present
the substantive creation of criminal liability for a new
offense; homicide was unlawful in 1956. As to homicide,
the proposed legislation is arguably jurisdictional in nature, and would not contravene the principle against retroactive criminal justice.
A similar analysis has applied in constitutional review of World War II-related prosecutions. Substantive
retroactive legislation has been distinguished from that
which is jurisdictional. Under this standard, the proposed homicide provisions would be understood to conferjurisdiction today on Hungary's courts with respect to
acts that were unlawful at the time they were committed.
With respect to the category of offenses, though the pro-

posed legislation still implies a tampering of a jurisdictional nature, it is compatible with the principle of rule of
law.

An importantjustification for thejurisdictional tampering is that the homicide acts that are the subject of the
challenged legislation fall within a category ofgrave criminal offenses, crimes against humanity. Protection of the
rule of law also implies adherence to fundamental international law norms such as the principle of the
imprescriptibility of crimes against humanity. The failure to refer to any national or international precedents on
this question is a glaring omission in the Hungarian constitutional court's opinion.
Notwithstanding the above, the challenged legislation may still suffer from a constitutional defect in its
selective retroactivity. The principle against retroactive
criminal legislation tells us something about the community we properly hold criminally accountable. If the proposed legislation is applied retroactively-and selectivelyits selective enforcement raises problems of bill of attainder and equal protection. There would be additional
problems which I have not addressed concerning the law's
enforcement, for example, the availability of defenses such

as due obedience.
The balance struck by the Hungarian constitutional
court whereby rule-of-law interests against jurisdictional
tamperings override the competing interest in adherence
to the principle ofthe imprescriptibility of crimes against
humanity in the long run will not afford legal certainty.
The question before the court involved competing principles of criminal justice, and as such will no doubt continue to haunt the region.
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I regard this as a decision ofa
very high legal standard. The
legal concepts it applies are
Member, ConseD d'etat
essential: rule of law; legal certainty; non-retroactivity of
Paris, Fran=e
criminal law;, nuflum crimem,
nulumpmna sine Lege; prohibition of vaguely worded statutes, especially in the field of criminal law;, equality before the law. There is little doubt that the decision will, in
time, be influential in the other Central and Eastern European countries.
How and when, we cannot know at this moment: it
will take some time for the decision to be fully translated
and known in the other countries. Other factors might
be: the scope of thejurisdiction of the new constitutional
courts; the kind of statutes that will be referred to them
(e.g. the Czechoslovak hsstracelaw); and, most important,
the quality of the judges sitting in the courts and the
general political context.

In due time, law professors, lawyers, members of
parliaments, judges and politicians will not be able to
ignore the Hungarian decision. The comments devoted
to it in Western European or North American lawjournals will no doubt find their way to Central and Eastern
European readers.
Any Western European reader of the decision cannot fail to recognize in it familiar notions. The content of
the concept of legal certainty, for example, owes much to
the case law of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights construing the words "prescribed bylaw,"
which figure in paragraph of many articles of the European Human Rights Convention. To a French reader at
least, the notions of necessity and proportionality of penalties evoke the corresponding clause of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. It is more difficult to find parallels from countries where there is no
statute of limitations (see, e.g. the English War Crimes

